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others’ privacy preferences. In recent privacy
literature, such interdependent nature of information
disclosure has been implicitly assumed as a new
source of privacy threat inherent to the OSN context.
However, there is almost no research that has
empirically quantified the extent to which others’
disclosure of information about an individual could
lead to actual privacy harm. As a first step to address
this gap in existing literature, we develop an
innovative measurement to capture an individual’s
actual privacy loss caused by self-disclosure vs. by
co-disclosure (i.e., disclosure of one’s private
information by other users of the OSN). To achieve
this research objective, we considered Twitter as a
case study. Specifically, we selected a sample of
Twitter users located in the US, retrieved all their
tweets along with the tweets of their followers,
identified the identity elements of a user that can be
inferred from his/her own tweets (self-disclosure) or
the tweets of his/her followers (co-disclosure), and
then proposed an information-theoretic measure that
captures the additional amount of privacy loss caused
by co-disclosure (on top of information that is
already self-disclosed).
The current study contributes to existing privacy
research in several important ways. First, prior
privacy research has heavily relied on collecting selfreported data to measure privacy related intentions or
beliefs as a proxy to study outcome variables. Given
that users often behave not necessarily in rational
ways when it concerns their privacy behaviors,
Bélanger & Xu (2015) suggested IS researchers to
“focus on actual behaviors as opposed to merely
individual intentions to behave when studying
information privacy.” The current research addressed
this methodological challenge by quantifying
possible negative consequences that could result from
users’ real information disclosure behaviors. Second,
positivist approaches have dominated in the IS field
where theory-based work has defined, predicted and
explained privacy-related constructs in various
nomological models (Smith et al. 2011). Although
the theory-based work has helped us build stronger
theoretical foundation and methodological rigor,
“some of us are increasingly raising doubts about
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The highly interactive nature of interpersonal
communication on online social networks (OSNs)
impels us to think about privacy as a communal
matter, with users’ private information being
revealed by not only their own voluntary disclosures,
but also the activities of their social ties. The current
privacy literature has identified two types of
information disclosures in OSNs: self-disclosure, i.e.,
the disclosure of an OSN user’s private information
by him/herself; and co-disclosure, i.e., the disclosure
of the user’s private information by other users.
Although co-disclosure has been increasingly
identified as a new source of privacy threat inherent
to the OSN context, few systematic attempts have
been made to provide a framework for understanding
the commonalities and distinctions between self- vs.
co-disclosure, especially pertaining to different types
of private information. To address this gap, this
paper presents a data-driven study that builds upon
an innovative measurement for quantifying the extent
to which others’ co-disclosure could lead to actual
privacy harm. The results demonstrate the significant
harm caused by co-disclosure and illustrate the
differences between the identity elements revealed
through self- and co-disclosure.

1. Introduction
Online
Social
Networks
(OSNs)
have
increasingly facilitated users’ voluntary information
disclosures that may not only reveal their own
identities but also their social ties’ identities (e.g.,
tagging a friend in a status update or in a place
checked-in). Such highly interactive nature of
interpersonal communication and data exchange
impels us to think about privacy as a communal
matter. As a result, there is a growing recognition of
grounding the investigation of privacy as an
interdependent phenomenon (Biczók and Chia 2013;
Jia and Xu 2015; 2016): While individuals are free to
decide what personal information they disclose, they
often cannot control what others disclose about them,
or how others may use the private information that
they disclose. Likewise, people may share
information that involves others in ways that violate
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whether we can relate what we have found in our
research to what practitioners or policymakers truly
experience in reality” (Bélanger & Xu 2015). This
research aims to extend the literature by pursuing a
data-driven approach to measure real information
privacy harms with observational Twitter data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section presents a review of background and
related literature. Following that, we define the
research questions studied in this paper, and describe
the two key components for measuring privacy loss:
the identity linkage model used by an adversary and
the information-theoretic metric of privacy
disclosure.
Equipped with the privacy-loss
measurement, we present our research methodology,
including the data collection process and the
experimental design over Twitter. We then describe
our research results and explain how these results
address the research questions. We conclude the
paper with discussions of limitations and potential
extensions of our work.

for understanding the commonalities and distinctions
between self- vs. co-disclosure, especially pertaining
to different types of private information.

2.2. Re-Identification Risks
An individual’s identity could be derived from
data generated from both online and offline worlds
(Creese et al. 2013; Ananthula et al 2015; Li and
Wang 2015). In particular, one’s offline identity
includes data elements such as name, date of birth,
gender, nationality, and relationships; online identity
includes data elements such as username, browsing
history, and email. Attribute disclosure occurs when
disclosed information help reveal a sensitive attribute
about an individual and associate it with the
individual (Li and Li 2009). No matter how mundane
the information, its disclosure can have significant
repercussions (Stutzman et al. 2013). That is because
seemingly innocuous
information such
as
demographic information (Sweeney 2000), movie
ratings (Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008) and search
queries (Barbaro and Zeller 2006) could be used to
identify individuals and reveal sensitive details about
them.
In today’s digital world, the rising threat to
privacy is further increased by the information found
in various data sources. More and more personal data
are collected and shared, including sensitive data
such as health and financial records that can be
publicly accessible online and remain available
indefinitely. Thus the increasing availability of
auxiliary records related to individuals has allowed
records to be linked and personal identities to be
revealed (Sweeney 2001). In addition, today’s OSNs
could afford new capabilities to combine social
identity elements with personal identity elements,
which will improve the accuracy of the identity
linkage techniques (Li and Wang 2011; Li and Wang
2015; Park et al. 2012). This increases the threats to
individuals’ privacy and makes OSNs a gateway to
access individuals’ personal information (Acquisti
2004; Madden et al. 2007).

2. Literature Review
2.1. Interpersonal Privacy Concerns on OSNs
Data privacy online and offline are of prime
importance to individuals. By revealing their personal
information, individuals make observers of their
personal information co-owners of it. This introduces
the problem known as interdependent privacy: users
are no longer in control of their privacy as other
users’ actions and interactions can affect their privacy
(Biczók and Chia 2013). Several research papers
have enriched our understanding of interdependent
privacy (Biczók and Chia 2013; Choi et al 2015; Pu
and Grossklags 2015). However, very few papers
focused on interdependent privacy in the OSNs
domain. Shi et al. (2013) identified users’
interpersonal privacy concerns arising from changes
in the visibility of their social interactions in
Facebook and the accessibility to it, aggregated, in a
single time-lined page. Even though no new
information has been revealed, but aggregating
interpersonal information can reveal more details
about individuals in unexpected ways (Shi et al.
2013). Choi et al (2015) offered insights on the
effects of interdependent privacy by evaluating
embarrassing exposures and found that even though
users might feel embarrassed, they still value the
social rewards of such disclosures. Although this
stream of research has conceptually identified users’
concerns towards interdependent privacy, there is a
lack of research examining the extent to which
others’ disclosure of information about an individual
could lead to actual privacy harm. We aim to address
this gap in this research by developing a framework

3. Research Questions
As discussed in the literature review section,
researchers have recently recognized the existence of
both self- and co-disclosure of private information in
social interactions, including those occurring on
OSNs (Jia and Xu 2015). Although there have been
several co-disclosure-centric studies focusing on how
various settings of OSNs can affect the arising of a
user’s privacy concerns from other users’ activities
(Shi et al. 2013, Choi et al. 2015, Jia and Xu 2015),
these studies do not further drill into the distinctions
between different types of private information (e.g.,
demographics, location, occupation). As a result, we
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do not yet sufficiently understand what types of
private information are more likely to be co-disclosed
by other users than self-disclosed by oneself; what
types of social interactions are more likely to lead to
co-disclosures of private information; and whether
such co-disclosure can indeed reveal a user’s identity
that would otherwise be hidden from the public.
Therefore, we aim to study the following two
research questions in this paper:
RQ1. What types of personal information are
more likely to be disclosed through self-disclosure
than co-disclosure, and vice versa?
RQ2. Does co-disclosure significantly increase
the privacy risk for an individual? Specifically, does
co-disclosure significantly increase the probability
for an individual to be uniquely identified based on
his/her activities on an OSN?
To address these two questions, we need to first
build two conceptual foundations. One, we need a
proper understanding of the state-of-the-practice
identity linkage model. Here we use the term
“identity linkage model” to refer to the method with
which a third party, i.e., someone who is neither the
OSN user of interest nor his/her friend who incurs the
co-disclosure, can infer the identity of the OSN user
from a combination of self- and co-disclosed
information about the user on the OSN. From this
point onwards, we refer to such a third party as an
adversary to the OSN user. Note that the identity
linkage model includes not only the techniques used
by the adversary to harvest data from the OSN, but
also the potential external knowledge sources it might
use to augment the self- and co-disclosed information
- in order to unveil the identity of the OSN user.
Second, we need a quantitative measure for the
degree of privacy leakage caused by co-disclosure on
top of self-disclosed information. To understand why
this is essential, consider two scenarios as follows:
Case A where an OSN user self-discloses her real
name and the city she lives in, while her friend codiscloses her home location; and Case B where the
OSN user self-discloses only her first name, while
her friend co-discloses her home location. While the
co-disclosure activity stays the same in the two
scenarios, the implication of this activity, i.e., the
additional information it discloses beyond the user’s
self-disclosures, varies significantly. As such, we
need a proper metric for the effect of co-disclosure
activities conditioned upon the self-disclosed
information.
In the following section, we describe the identity
linkage model we shall use in the paper and an
information-theoretic measure of conditional
information disclosure.

4. Measurement Development
4.1. Identity Linkage Model
Recall from previous discussions the identity linkage
model defines the threat faced by an OSN user on the
privacy front – i.e., how an adversary can violate an
OSN user’s privacy based on self- and co-disclosed
information, along with external knowledge sources.
Given the complexity of privacy construct, both
conceptually and operationally, and how it varies
from one individual to another (e.g., one user might
only care about the disclosure of sexual orientation,
while another might care more about the disclosure
of his/her relationship with another user of the OSN),
to properly define the identity linkage model, we
must first define the scope of privacy concerns we
focus on. For the purpose of this paper, we focus on
a specific type of privacy concern: the ability for an
adversary to associate a user of an OSN with the
user’s real-world identity. Given this focus, our goal
is to define an identity linkage model with which an
adversary unveils the identity of an OSN user from
the user’s publicly accessible activities on the OSN.
The identity linkage model has two key elements:
The first is the world in which the adversary operates
(Jin et al 2010) - i.e., the population from which the
adversary attempts to identify the OSN user. For the
purpose of this paper, we consider the world to be the
entire population of US.
The second is the OSN activities used by the
adversary. A well understood phenomenon of OSNs
is that many OSN users self-disclose their real-world
identities or identity elements (i.e., personal attributes
such as age or gender) through their public profiles at
the OSN (Malhotra et al. 2012). The underlying
reason is straightforward - revealing identities in the
user profile is a simple way to acquire OSN
connections through real-world acquaintances, as the
OSN user’s real-world circles of family and friends
can identify him/her from the profile and build OSN
connections accordingly.
Additionally, identities or identity elements may
also be disclosed through (publicly accessible) social
interactions between an OSN user and his/her OSN
connections. Here the disclosure may happen in the
form of self- or co-disclosure. As an example of the
latter type, consider a privacy-conscious user who
chooses to never post a geo-embedded post. Even so,
one of her OSN friends might tag her in a geoembedded post, essentially revealing her location
through co-disclosure.
There are two important observations associated
with both self- and co-disclosures: One, privacy
disclosure could happen from contents or metadata of
OSN activities. An example of the former is when the
location is described as text in a post, while an
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example of the latter is when location is revealed
through a geotag associated with the post. Second,
privacy disclosure could happen through explicit
exposure or implicit inferences. Disclosing the city

element, the adversary now has a reduced
uncertainty: from one in 316 million to
approximately half of it (i.e., about 158 million with
the same gender). Correspondingly, the entropy is

Table 1. Identity Elements and their Information Content

Identity
Elements
Privacy Loss
(bits)

Gender

First
name
10.7†

1†
10.9

Last
name
13†

Age

Month &
day of birth
8.5‡

6.3‡

State
5*

Zip
code
13.8*

Home
address
26.9*

†

22.9†

14.7‡

*

Based on 2010 Census data.
Based on 43 million 2015-2016 Voters Registration records from 9 States in the USA.
‡
Based on 24 million 2015-2016 Voters Registration records from 5 States in the USA (a subset of the previous
dataset, only these 5 states report date of birth information).
†

reduced by 1 bit to log2(158 million) = 27.2 bits. In
this case, we say that the privacy loss caused by
gender is 1 bit, i.e., the amount of entropy by which
the adversary’s uncertainty is reduced.
More formally, we define the privacy loss caused
by a set of identity elements E having value V to be

name in a post called “Hometown” is an example of
explicit exposure, while implicit inference occurs
when a user has numerous posts geotagged in the
same city. In the latter case, even though the user has
never directly disclosed the city he/she lives in, an
adversary can easily identify such information
through common-sense inference.

4.2. Information-Theoretic Measurement of
Privacy Disclosure
To quantify the loss of privacy in an objective
manner, we introduce an information-theoretic metric
that can capture not only the overall risk for an OSN
user to be identified, but also the effect of individual
identity elements and combinations of them on the
identification of the OSN user. The root of the
information-theoretic measurement is the concept of
information entropy (measured in bits), which
reflects the degree of uncertainty for a random
variable with a probability distribution (Cover and
Thomas 2006). In general, a bit of entropy represents
the uncertainty associated with a single toss of a fair
coin. The higher the uncertainty is, the higher the
entropy will be, and vice versa. This semantic
definition of information entropy (Brickel and
Shmatikov 2008) has been used in the literature to
measure many security and privacy related
constructs, including genome and genetics privacy
(Humbert et al. 2013; Erlich and Narayanan 2014).
In the context of our privacy study, consider the
uncertainty an adversary faces on identifying an OSN
user when it has no information about the user
whatsoever. Roughly speaking, the adversary has no
way of distinguishing between the 316 million people
in the US population (per US Census 2013). This
uncertainty – as reflected by the uniform distribution
over 316 million possible values - translates to
log2(316 million) = 28.2 bits of entropy. Now
consider the case where the OSN user’s activities
reveal the user’s gender. Equipped with this identity

where x1, …, xn form the population under
consideration (the US population in our case), p(xi) is
the probability for xi to be the OSN user of interest,
and p(xi|E = V) is the probability for xi to be the OSN
user of interest given knowledge that the identity
elements E of the user have value V. In our previous
example, there are p(xi) = 1/316 million for all i ∈ [1,
316000000], p(xi|Gender = Female) = 1/158 million
for all i ∈ [1, 158000000] 1, and p(xi|Gender =
Female) = 0 for all i ∈ [158000001, 316000000],
leading to L(Gender = Female) = –log2158000000 +
log2316000000 = 1 bit. Based on this definition, we
can further define the privacy loss associated with a
set of identity elements E to be the expected value of
L(E = V) for all possible values V of E. In the above
example, we have L(Gender) = 1/2 L(Gender =
Female) + 1/2 L(Gender = Male) = 1 bit.
It is important to note that the privacy loss
function L(•) is not homomorphic to the set union
operation, but is convex instead (Cover and Thomas
2006). That is, L(E1) + L(E2) ≥ L(E1∪E2). For
example, if L(First name) = 10.7 bits while
L(Gender) = 1 bit, it does not mean L({First name,
Gender}) = 10.7 + 1 = 11.7 bit. Instead, the total
privacy loss from (an adversary learning) both First
1

Without loss of generality, here we assume x1, …,
x158000000 to be female and the rest of xi to be male.
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name and Gender is smaller, because some part of the
information revealed by Gender is already revealed
by First name – e.g., if an adversary knows that the
OSN user has first name Alice, then it can already
infer the user’s Gender with high confidence, making
the privacy loss from further disclosing Gender much
less than 1 bit.
As we shall show in latter part of the paper, this
convexity of privacy loss measure plays a rather
important role in our understanding of the
relationship between self- and co-disclosures. Table 1
summarizes the privacy loss from various identity
elements and certain combinations of them. Note
that, to generate the table, we used multiple datasets
from the US Census to state voters’ registration
records, as different datasets feature different identity
elements included in the table. One can make some
interesting observations from the table: For example,
gender and first name turn out to be strongly
correlated elements, as gender only increases the
privacy loss by 0.2 bits once first name is revealed.
On the other hand, the correlation between first name
or gender and last name is significantly less – the
privacy loss caused by revealing last name (on top of
first name and gender) is about 12 bits, only 1 bit less
than the privacy loss caused by last name alone
(13bits).

process produced 44,124 valid Twitter users, on
which we then applied the following filtering
process. Since we decided to focus on the US
population in the identity linkage model, we first
filtered out all users who are not located in the US.
To do so, we considered not only the location and
time-zone attributes of the user profile, but also the
geo-locations embedded in the user tweets. Those
users with a majority of geo-tagged tweets posted
from outside the US were removed from
consideration. Finally, we removed those “inactive”
users, i.e., those who (1) do not have any public
tweets, or (2) do not have any followers or followees.
After applying these filters, we were left with
1,520 Twitter users. We then manually examined
each of these 1,520 accounts and further excluded
163 of them that are obviously not personal accounts
– i.e., they are self-declared accounts for businesses
and organizations. We used the remaining 1,357
Twitter users to perform our subsequent analysis.
Data Collected for Each User: For each selected
user, we collected its OSN activities in three
categories: 1) the user’s profile, 2) all tweets posted
by the user, and 3) all tweets posted by the user’s
followers that mentioned the user (i.e., tagged using
“@” followed by the user handle). Note that we
considered only followers but not followees here
because, per our experimental results, it is extremely
unlikely for a user to be mentioned by a followee
who is not at the same time a follower of the user.
To collect the data, we used the Twitter Search API
to access all information publicly available about
users and their followers, and the Google Maps
Geocoding API to convert the Geo-locations
extracted from tweets to full addresses.

5. Research Methodology
Equipped with the identity linkage model and the
information-theoretic measurement of privacy
disclosure, we studied the effect of self- and codisclosures on the privacy loss of Twitter users. We
chose Twitter as the OSN platform for our study due
to two main reasons: 1. Twitter users often post
tweets that represent direct interactions between each
other; yet such interactions can be openly accessed
by third parties – constituting co-disclosure of private
information. 2. Twitter provides free APIs that
facilitate the extraction and analysis of large amounts
of user interaction data. In the following discussions,
we describe the data collection process we followed
and the design of the experiments, respectively.

5.2. Experimental Design
The objective of experimental design is to
identify and measure the privacy disclosure incurred
by the collected (publicly available) data. After
examining the collected data, we identified six
categories of identity elements that are often
disclosed through self- or co-disclosure on Twitter:
name, location, gender, birthday, age, and family
relationships (e.g., siblings, spouse, parents). Each
category further consists of identity elements at
different granularities. For example, the disclosure of
name might be first name only, last name only, or full
name.
Similarly, the disclosure of location
information might be at the metropolitan area level,
at the ZIP code level, or revealing the exact address.
Table 2 summarizes how self- and co-disclosures
often occur for each of these six categories of identity
elements. It also depicts how we identify disclosures
in our experimental study. Specifically, we followed
a three-step, manual-automated-manual process. We

5.1. Data Collection
There are two key elements of the data collection
process: (1) the set of users we selected for data
collection; and (2) the data we collected for each
selected user. We discuss these two elements
respectively as follows.
Selected Users: Since Twitter uses numeric user IDs
with an easily identifiable range, we started by
sampling uniformly at random 50,000 numeric IDs,
and then used the Twitter REST API users/show to
validate the existence of the user ID and to retrieve
profile information of the user. This validation

Page 896

5

Table 2. Self- and Co-Disclosure of Identity Elements

Identity Elements
Name

Location
Information
Gender

Birthday

Self-Disclosures
The name could be extracted from the
name attribute or inferred from the screen
name of the user profile.
The location could be extracted from the
location attribute of the user profile or
inferred from geo-enabled tweets.
The gender of the user could be inferred
from the bio attribute of the user profile as
some users describe themselves as a father
or mother or wife or husband.
Disclosed by user tweets that mention
birthday.

Age

Disclosed by user tweets that mention age,
year of birth, etc.

Family
Relationships

Relationships could be inferred from user
tweets mentioning relatives such as
siblings, spouses, and parents.

started with manually examining a small sample of
tweets to identify the disclosure patterns summarized
in Table 2. Then, we translate each pattern to a
filtering condition that is automatically applied to all
downloaded tweets to identify those candidates that
could potentially disclose private information. For
example, candidates for birthday co-disclosure were
identified with a conjunctive condition of (1) “@”
another user, and (2) contains keyword “birthday”. In
the final step, we manually examine each candidate
to confirm self- or co-disclosures. This final step
removes false positives that meet the candidacy
criteria but do not actually reveal precise information,
e.g., “your birthday is more than 6 months away”.
One can make several observations from the
table: First, the way identity elements are disclosed
on Twitter is often ad-hoc, especially in the case of
co-disclosures. For example, user A’s birthday may
be disclosed by a follower B’s tweet “Met @C in
@A’s birthday party yesterday”. There are two
implications of such ad-hoc disclosures: First, the
wide variety of ways for an identity element to be
disclosed required us to manually examine the
collected data instead of relying on an automated
process. Second, it also calls into question the
comprehensiveness of disclosures identified in our
experimental design, as it is possible for a subtle
disclosure to be missed in our manual examination
process. We discuss the issue of comprehensiveness
and the implications in the discussion section.
Second, self- and co-disclosures often take
different forms. Specifically, while self-disclosures

Co-Disclosures
The name could be extracted from tweets
that mention the user.
The location could be inferred from geoenabled tweets that tag the user.
The gender could be inferred from tweets
mentioning the user that include relational or
gender specific data such as sister or bro.
Birthday information could be inferred from
co-owners’ tweets of birthday wishes to the
user, e.g., “Happy Birthday”
Age information could also be inferred from
birthday wishes, e.g., “Happy 43rd
Birthday!”
Relationships could be inferred from tweets
coming from relatives such as “Miss you
mom” or “Happy Birthday Dad”, etc.

usually happen through direct statements (e.g.,
describing oneself as a proud mom directly discloses
the gender of the user), co-disclosures tend to be
subtler, and often occur through inference – e.g.,
being tagged in a tweet that is marked with the
location of a restaurant. This difference makes codisclosures harder to identify than self-disclosures.
Again, we discuss the implication of this difference
in the discussion section.

6. Research Results: RQ1 and RQ2
Following the data collection procedure and the
experimental design outlined in the research
methodology section, we examined the two research
questions RQ1 and RQ2 respectively. Specifically,
we first identified the self- and co-disclosures of the
six identity elements listed in Table 2. Our study of
RQ1 focused on comparing the two types of
disclosures. Then, we used the information-theoretic
measurement of privacy disclosure to further quantify
the average privacy loss from self- and codisclosures. The results were used in our study of
RQ2, i.e., whether co-disclosures significantly
increase privacy loss on top of self-disclosures.

6.1. RQ1: Self-Disclosure vs Co-Disclosure
Figure 1 depicts the percentage of the 1,357
selected Twitter users who have their identity
elements self- or co-disclosed through their Twitter
activities. We marked each identity element with
either self- or co-disclosure, leading to 12 categories.
One can see from the figure that, for each identity
element, the percentage of users having the element
disclosed through either self- or co-disclosure ranges
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To address RQ2, we measured the amount of
privacy loss resulted from the disclosure of identity
elements. Specifically, we first measured the amount
of privacy loss from self-disclosures, and then
computed the amount of additional privacy loss
caused by co-disclosures. For example, if a user selfdiscloses his/her first name but not gender, and a
follower of the user further co-discloses the gender of
the user, then the amount of additional privacy
disclosure is not 1 bit (as disclosing gender would
incur), but only 0.2 bit because, per Table 1, the
privacy loss from self-disclosure, i.e., first name, is
10.7 bits while the total loss from both self- and codisclosures is 10.9 bits. As such, the amount of
additional privacy loss caused by co-disclosure is
10.9 – 10.7 = 0.2 bit.
Figure 2 depicts the results from our study on
users with both self- and co-disclosures. Note from
the figure that we grouped all these users into 10

from 1.7% (co-disclosure for ZIP code) to 23.7% (codisclosure for gender). The comparison between selfand co-disclosure, however, varies significantly for
different identity elements.
To further study the comparison, we performed
the paired-sample t-test for each identity element to
determine whether there is a significant statistical
difference between the probability of the self- and codisclosure of the element. Table 3 depicts the results.
One can see that all but one identity element exhibit
significant difference between the levels of self- and
co-disclosure. Specifically, for first name, age and
ZIP code, self-disclosure is significantly more
frequent than co-disclosure. For birthday and gender,
co-disclosure is more frequent. For all these five
categories, we have p-value < 0.001. The disclosure
of relatives (i.e., personal relationships), on the other
hand, does not show a significant difference between
self- and co-disclosures, with p = 0.2439.

Figure 1. Percentage of Self- and Co-Disclosure for Identity Elements
Table 3. Statistical Differences between Self- and Co-Disclosures (Paired-Sample t-test)

Category

Identity
Element

Self-Disclosed

Co-Disclosed

Self > Co

first name
181
age
96
zip
251
Co > Self
birthday
135
gender
27
Insignificant
relatives
71
Another interesting observation from Table 3 is
that self- and co-disclosure are positively correlated
with each other. We performed the χ2-test over each
identity element, and the null hypothesis of
independence is rejected for every identity element
with p < 0.0001.

Disclosed by both

p-value

71
66
1.4495e-24
58
21
3.2160e-04
24
12
2.7818e-50
233
79
9.3014e-12
322
15
3.9476e-68
83
24
0.2439
buckets according to the amount of privacy loss from
self-disclosure alone. The first bucket, for example,
consists of the users with self-disclosure privacy loss
at 0 – 10 percentile (i.e., the lowest 10% of all
users). Then, for each bucket, we measured the
average amount of additional privacy loss caused by
co-disclosures.

6.2. RQ2: Does co-disclosure significantly
increase the privacy risk?
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manner. For example, we could not find accurate
statistics for the viewer distribution of the movie.
Thus, in this paper, we focused on only those
disclosures that deterministically reveal an identity
element of the user, and did not further study the vast
varieties of other, probabilistic, inference channels.
Despite the lack of comprehensiveness on the
identification of self- and co-disclosure channels, we
would like to emphasize our belief that the results
presented in this paper remain valid even after
considering other disclosure channels. The main
reason is the observation discussed in the
experimental design section: while self-disclosure
often takes the form of direct statements, it is codisclosure that usually occurs over the subtle,
complex and hard-to-enumerate inference channels.
Thus, the importance of co-disclosures could only be
amplified if we were to include the probabilistic
inference channels into consideration. Given that the
results in this paper already demonstrate the
additional privacy loss incurred by co-disclosures, we
leave the investigations of probabilistic inference
channels to future studies.
Effects of Privacy Settings: Currently, Twitter
allows users to adjust their privacy settings to hide
their twitters and the list of their followers / followees
(but not their profile information, like selfdescriptions). Interestingly, we found that making
one’s Twitter account private is not an effective way
to thwart the co-disclosures discussed in this paper.
Specifically, the information that constitutes codisclosures remains publicly accessible, just more
difficult to find for an adversary. For example, even
if User A sets her Twitter account to be private, one
can still find A’s name in the follower list of user B,
if B sets her account to be public. Similarly, the
tagging of user A remains publicly visible in the
tweets posed by User B. These policies make it
impossible for a user to block co-disclosures through
adjusting his/her privacy settings at Twitter.
Nevertheless, setting one’s account to private does
make it harder for an adversary to discover the codisclosures, as it would have to (somehow) find the
followers of the user without access to a
comprehensive list. This is still feasible, however,
especially when the adversary has the technical
capacity to store and index all tweets (e.g., from the
Twitter Firehose) that might contain information
about the user of interest.
Limitations: We acknowledge several limitations in
our studies. First, the scale of the experiments was
constrained by the query access limitation enforced
by Twitter, i.e., its APIs limit the number of requests
to 15 or 180 requests per 15-minute window. This, in
turn, limited the number of users that could be

Figure 2. Additional Privacy Loss from Co-Disclosure

Somewhat surprisingly, the figure appears to
suggest that, the less a user self-discloses, the more
his/her followers are likely to co-disclose about
him/her. While this result might appear counterintuitive - what it indeed entails is that, for the same
co-disclosure behavior, the less information a user
self-discloses, the more damage (to privacy) the codisclosure will incur. Although not shown in Figure
2, we studied the correlation between the amount of
self-disclosure and co-disclosures alone, and the
Pearson correlation coefficient between them is
0.0598 – demonstrating a positive, albeit weak,
correlation. On the other hand, if we measure the
correlation between the privacy loss from selfdisclosure and the additional privacy loss from codisclosure, the coefficient becomes -0.6689,
confirming our observation of the negative
correlation from Figure 2.

7. Discussions
Comprehensiveness of Self- and Co-Disclosure
Identification: As mentioned in the experimental
design section, we identified in our studies numerous
possible ways for identity elements to be disclosed
through inferences - e.g., the timestamp of a “happy
birthday” message discloses the birthday of the
recipient, while the tagging of a user in a “bachelor’s
party” or “girls’ night out” reveals the gender.
Given the ad hoc nature of such inference channel, it
is important for us to admit that the disclosures
identified in our study might not be comprehensive.
For example, if a user is tagged in a message
describing a movie watching party for “The
Sisterhood of The Traveling Pants”, then the gender
and age of the user may be inferred with a high
confidence, given that the movie is also perceived as
targeting a female, younger, audience. It is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to identify all such
disclosure channels and measure them in a systematic

Page 899

8

included in the experiments, given that we would
have to query every follower of each selected user.
Second, Twitter limits the maximum number of
tweets from one user that can be retrieved through the
Search API to 3,200. In our experiments, 168 out of
1,357 users triggered this limit - i.e., for these users,
only the most recent 3,200 tweets were retrieved
through the API and considered in our experiments.
While these 168 users tend to be the most active ones
who already have high levels of privacy disclosure
(their average self-disclosure based privacy loss is
26.46 bits, compared an average of 5.00 bits for all
1,357 users), the limitation of 3,200 tweets makes it
possible for our study to still underestimate the
privacy loss for these users. To this end, we plan to
conduct a future study on privacy loss from a
longitudinal perspective, to understand the impact of
such limit on the disclosure of privacy information.
Another limitation of our approach stems from
the manual efforts in our experimental design. While
such efforts are essential to eliminating false
positives and establishing lower-bound estimates of
disclosures, they prevent the study from scaling to a
larger sample of Twitter users. To this end, we plan
to investigate in future studies the usage of text
mining and natural language processing (NLP)
techniques to automate disclosure identifications.

15-1-0020. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions
or recommendations expressed in this material do not
necessarily reflect the views of the sponsors.
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